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II. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
These are consolidated appeals in a criminal case. Case No. 40237 is an appeal from the 
denial of a Criminal Rule 35 motion. Case No. 39526 is an appeal from the denial of a motion to 
modify a no contact order (NCO). 1 Relief should be granted in Case No. 40237 because the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to consider Mr. Vaughn's character and background 
in denying the Rule 35 motion. Relief should be granted in Case No. 39526 because the district 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion to modify the NCO insofar as the court 
misunderstood the record before it and insofar as the court did not act consistently with the 
constitutional limitations on NCOs involving parents and their own children. 
B. Procedural History 
In 2009, Appellant Charles Vaughn entered a guilty plea to domestic violence in the 
presence of children and was sentenced to 20 years, with five fixed, and a $5000 fine. R 38862, 
pp. 43-45, pp. 74-76.2 Following a grant of post-conviction relief, the district court entered an 
order re-imposing judgment of conviction and commitment. R 38862, pp. 88-91. Mr. Vaughn 
filed a notice of appeal and his conviction and sentence were affirmed in an unpublished opinion 
in Case No. 38862 on November 21, 2011. The remittitur in that appeal was issued on December 
20, 2011. ROA CR-FE-2009-0014391. 
1 These cases were consolidated per this Court's order of August 14, 2012. R 40237, pp. 
3-4. 
2 This Court has taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript 
filed in the prior appeal No. 38862, State v. Vaughn, per its order filed in Case No. 39526, on 
February 1, 2012. 
In the meantime, while the appeal was pending in Case No. 38862, Mr. Vaughn filed a 
Criminal Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of his sentence. R 4023 7, pp. 10-11. Mr. Vaughn 
filed a brief and numerous exhibits in support of his motion. R 40237, pp. 12-108. On the same 
day Mr. Vaughn filed the Rule 35 motion, he filed a motion to modify the NCO in his case. 
Augmented Record, 9/14/11 Motion to Modify No Contact Order. 
The state filed an opposition to the Rule 35 motion. R 40237, pp. 109-110. And, without 
a hearing, the district court denied the motion. R 40237, pp. 111-116. The court also denied the 
motion to modify the NCO. Augmented Record, 9/22/11 Order Denying Motion to Modify No 
Contact Order. 
A timely notice of appeal followed. R 4023 7, pp. 117-119. The notice of appeal stated 
that Mr. Vaughn "appeals against the above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
the final Decision and order entered against him on the above-entitled action on the 22nd day of 
September, 2011." The notice further stated that the issue Mr. Vaughn intended to assert on 
appeal was whether the court erred in denying the Rule 35 motion. R 40237, pp. 117-119.3 
Then on November 7, 2011, Mr. Vaughn, filed a prose motion to modify the NCO which 
had been issued in connection with the criminal case. R 39526, pp. 8-9. He also filed a prose 
brief in support of his motion. R 39526, pp. 10-25. 
The state filed an opposition. R 39526, pp. 26-27. 
3 Thereafter, Mr. Vaughn filed a prose Criminal Rule 33 motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. R40237,pp.121-124. That motion was denied. R40237,pp.127-137. Mr. Vaughn filed 
a timely pro se notice of appeal referring both to the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea and to a successive post-conviction motion. R 40237, pp. 138-140. The ROA for CV-PC-
2012-02412 shows that appellate counsel was denied as to the post-conviction appeal and that the 
appeal was dismissed. This Court entered its remittitur on November 14, 2012. Case No. 40174. 
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A hearing was set, and a public defender appeared on Mr. Vaughn's behalf. Tr. 12/14/11. 
Thereafter, the district court denied the motion. R 39526, pp. 32-33. And, Mr. Vaughn 
filed a timely prose notice of appeal. R 39526, pp. 33-36. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Plea and Sentencing 
On August 17, 2009, Mr. Vaughn was charged by information with attempted 
strangulation, domestic violence in the presence of children, and two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance. R 38862, pp. 30-31. The information was later amended to add 
misdemeanor charges of injury to a child (C.S.) and resisting and obstructing officers. R 38862, 
pp. 43-44. 
A plea agreement was reached whereby Mr. Vaughn pled guilty to a single count of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child and the rest of the charges were dismissed. The state 
further agreed to limit its sentencing recommendation to sixteen years with no agreement as to 
how much of that term should be fixed and how much indeterminate. As part of the plea 
agreement, Mr. Vaughn agreed to an NCO between himself and the victim and himself and his 
children. R 38862, p. 63; Tr. 10/28/09, p. 7, In. 7-17. No reference was made to the 
constitutional rights implicated by an NCO nor was there any discussion of the duration of any 
NCO. Id. Mr. Vaughn retained his right to appeal the judgment imposing sentence. Tr. 
10/28/09, p. 21, ln. 11-12. 
The court established that Mr. Vaughn agreed that he struck, or punched or slammed 
Tiffany Vaughn's head into a wall while in the presence of children - specifically C and K, ages 8 
and 7 respectively. Tr. 10/28/09, p. 23, ln. 7- p. 24, ln. 15. 
3 
According to the ofiicial version of the case in the PSI, the police responded to a 91 l call 
during which a fight and a woman yelling for help could be heard. They found the woman, 
Tiffany Vaughn, at a neighbor's house. Ms. Vaughn reported that she and Mr. Vaughn were 
arguing about whether she was having an affair and he pushed her down on a bed and began to 
strangle her with his hands. She kicked him off and the fight continued with him grabbing her 
hair and hitting her in the head. C, Ms. Vaughn's eight year old son, came to his mother's aid. 
Mr. Vaughn dragged him by the arm and neck, threw him onto the bed, picked up a pillow case, 
and told C that he was going to kill him. PSI pp. 1-2. 
According to the official version, the police found Mr. Vaughn in the house. He asked 
the police what was going on and said that he had been in bed. He said that Ms. Vaughn was a 
methamphetamine and pill user and denied any altercation with her or the children. PSI p. 2. 
Police found a pocket knife in Mr. Vaughn's pocket. In the house, they found a rope, 
duct tape, a recorder, a digital camera and a drug test belonging to Mr. Vaughn. He reportedly 
told the police that these items would help him prove what he believed his wife was doing. Ms. 
Vaughn said that Mr. Vaughn had left the recorder on while he was out of the house; when he 
came back he listened to it and said that it proved someone was watching or following him. Ms. 
Vaughn wrote that Mr. Vaughn felt that "they were lying to him and that everyone in Idaho is 
under brainwashing government control." She also said that he had told her and the children that 
he was done, had nothing to live for, and was going to kill them. PSI p. 2. 
According to Ms. Vaughn's statement to the police, Mr. Vaughn had a history of mental 
illness. She and Mr. Vaughn had lived in Florida, but then he was committed to a hospital by his 
parents and she moved to Idaho. From Ms. Vaughn's statement, it appears that Mr. Vaughn had 
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been released from the hospital just shortly before he came to Idaho and before the events that led 
to this case. PSI p. 44. 
Police found drugs and paraphernalia including oxycodone and methamphetamine by the 
bed and Mr. Vaughn admitted that he and Ms. Vaughn had recently injected methamphetamine. 
PSI p. 2. 
In his statement for the PSI, Mr. Vaughn said that he and his wife had used 
methamphetamine and pain killer for the first time through LV., and that he had never reacted 
this way before. He did things that he cannot remember but he was to blame. He said that he 
was ashamed and wished that it had never happened. He said that drug use had made him 
paranoid about his wife's behavior and he admitted pulling her hair, pushing her, and hitting her 
and grabbing C. Mr. Vaughn said that he recognizes that he has drug and anger problems. Mr. 
Vaughn admitted to speaking twice to his wife after his arrest and said that he had contacted a 
neighbor in an attempt to tell her that he was sorry. He said that he loves his family and would 
like to have the NCO order modified so that they could ,vrite letters, talk on the phone, and visit 
in the jail. PSI pp. 3-4. 
According to the PSI, Mr. Vaughn has three biological daughters: T age 9, Sage 8, and 
Wage 4. He also has four stepchildren: Sage 1 Cage 9, K 7, and J age 5. At the time the 
PSI was prepared, T and S lived with Mr. Vaughn's mother, and Wand all the stepchildren lived 
with Ms. Vaughn. PSI pp. 8-9. 
Mr. Vaughn wrote a letter attached to the PSI which expressed his understanding that as a 
result of using methamphetamine, he wound up doing things that were unacceptable. He 
acknowledged his shame and expressed his apologies to everyone. He stated that he knew that 
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he had no excuses for his actions and took full responsibility. He also said that he loved his 
family including his seven children very much and pleaded for a sentence that would not take 
him to prison and completely out of his family's life. He said that he wanted to be present to take 
care of and raise his family. PSI pp. 21-22. 
Mr. Vaughn's first wife, Kathy, the mother of two of Mr. Vaughn's children, wrote to the 
court that Mr. Vaughn had been a wonderful father and husband and had never put her or their 
children in danger. PSI pp. 23-24. 
The court ordered a mental health evaluation which assessed Mr. Vaughn's "level of 
danger" as a moderate to high risk. PSI p. 141. The assessment also stated, "Sobriety is pivotal 
to Mr. Vaughn's mental health and would more than likely result in a decrease of behavioral 
acting out." PSI p. 142. 
The domestic battery evaluator concluded that Mr. Vaughn's profile suggested an 
extremely high risk for domestic violence as well as violence towards members of the 
community at large. The evaluator concluded that upon successful completion of several 
suggested programs, Mr. Vaughn should be reassessed to determine if he continues to pose a risk 
to intimate partners, his children, and the community. PSI p. 153. 
At the sentencing hearing, the state argued for a sentence of sixteen years - five fixed 
followed by eleven indetenninate. Tr. 12/20/09, p. 10, In. 2-3. The state based its request upon 
its statement that Mr. Vaughn had been unsuccessful on a felony probation in Florida. The state 
also noted the domestic violence evaluation. Tr. 12/10/09, p. 10, In. 15 - p. 12, In. 22. 
Mr. Vaughn's counsel asked for a two year fixed sentence with whatever indeterminate 
time the court found appropriate. He noted that Mr. Vaughn could complete the recommended 
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programming in two years or less. Tr. 12/30/09, p. 22, In. 21 - p. 23, In. 3. He also noted that 
Mr. Vaughn did not have a "lot ofrecord" of violence and that much of what happened had to do 
with drugs. Tr. 12/30/09, p. 24, In. 14 - p. 25, In. 5. 
Mr. Vaughn told the court that he was sorry and that he loved his family. Tr. 12/30/09, p. 
27,ln.16-20. 
At the sentencing hearing, the state also referenced a letter Mr. Vaughn had sent to his 
parents while he was incarcerated stating that if he could out, Ms. Vaughn might let him see 
daughter Wand that he might take that chance to take Wand run. Tr. 12/30/09, p. 12, In. 23-p. 
13, In. 5. 
The court cited this as a basis of issuing an NCO with regard to W. Tr. 12/3 0/09 p. 31, 
ln. I 18. The court stated that it believed Mr. Vaughn was a threat to the safety of his wife and 
step-children and hence was entering NCOs for them. The court stated that in the future it might 
consider based upon an "assessment while incarcerated" modifying the order with regard to W. 
Tr. 12/30/09, p. 34, in. 22 - p. 35, ln. 17. The court then imposed a sentence of 20 years with five 
fixed. Tr. 12/30/09, p. 37, ln. 17-23. 
2. Rule 35 Motion 
Mr. Vaughn was sentenced on December 30, 2009. His sentence was re-imposed on May 
25, 2011, following a grant of post-conviction relief. R 38862 pp. 88-99. Thereafter, Mr. 
Vaughn filed a timely Rule 3 5 motion for reduction of sentence. R 4023 7 pp. 10-11. 
Mr. Vaughn's motion was supported by a brief and 37 exhibits. In his brief, Mr. Vaughn 
noted that because of the length of the fixed time he was given, he was not allowed to participate 
in prison rehabilitative programming. Rather, he was being housed at ICC. R 40237, p. 13. 
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In his brief, Mr. Vaughn argued that a reduction in his sentence was wananted in light of 
the factors required to be considered in sentencing, the absence of meaningful rehabilitative 
programming open to him at the prison, and the information contained in his supporting exhibits. 
R 40237, p. 15. 
With regard to the protection of society, Mr. Vaughn argued that he had learned his 
lesson - he had now served significant time in custody and he was extremely unlikely to ever 
commit a crime of this nature again. Further, even if his fixed term was reduced, he would still 
be under state supervision and would have to continue his rehabilitation or face further 
imprisonment. R 40237, p. 16. 
Mr. Vaughn argued the same holds true for the question of deterrence. He had learned his 
lesson and was extremely unlikely to commit other crimes in the future. Id. 
Mr. Vaughn argued that his sentence as it now stood actually reduced the chances of 
rehabilitation because the length of his fixed term made him ineligible for programming. And, 
with regard to retribution, Mr. Vaughn argued that he had already been significantly punished 
having lost his freedom, employment, assets, and reputation and having been separated from his 
family. R 40237, p. 17. 
Mr. Vaughn's 37 exhibits included a letter he wrote to the court. He stated that he was to 
blame for his own actions. He acknowledged that he had failed his wife and children. He set out 
the positive things he had done as a father and husband prior to the events that underlay this case. 
Be had worked and supported his wives and his children. He had been an active father, attending 
school meetings, volunteering in the school and scouts, coaching T-ball, volunteering at church, 
and spending good time with his family doing things like going to shop or to dinner or to movies. 
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R 40237, pp. 20-21. 
Mr. Vaughn wrote that drugs had played a huge part in his wrong acts. He now 
understood that he can never use drugs or alcohol or be around people that use either. He noted 
that even though drugs are available in prison, he has chosen not to ever use them again. R 
40237, p. 22. 
Mr. Vaughn also wrote that he understood that his actions had affected his wife, their 
children, his parents and others. He spoke of the mental and emotional pain of having his wife 
taken out of his life. He noted that because of his and his wife's poor choices, they had lost their 
children who were now being raised in foster homes and/or with other relatives. He wrote that 
he would always blame himself for this situation. R 40237, p. 22-23. 
Mr. Vaughn wrote of his efforts at rehabilitation and treatment while in prison. While he 
cannot participate in much of the recommended programming because his fixed term is so long, 
he had completed "Motivation to Change" and was on the waiting list for many other programs. 
In the meantime, he had learned to use a library and for the first time in his life he was reading. 
R 40237, pp. 24-25. 
He also wrote about the NCO. He first stated that he could see that the court had been 
correct in stopping his contact with his wife. He wrote that it was important because it kept him 
from returning to a relationship that needed either to be helped or to end. R 40237, p. 25. 
Mr. Vaughn noted that his wife had been involved in three other different domestic 
violence altercations since he had been in prison and that as a result, a child protection case had 
been opened as to both him and her. For a variety of reasons, Health and Welfare's efforts to 
reunite his children with their mother had failed and both he and she were facing termination of 
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their parental rights. R 40237 pp. 
Mr. Vaughn wrote that his parents now had custody of his two biological daughters from 
a prior marriage and W, his daughter who is the subject of the NCO in this case. He asked that 
the NCO be amended as to W to allow him to write to W, send her cards, and talk to her on the 
phone. He expressed eoncem that he would have to terminate his contact with his older two 
children and his parents in order to honor the NCO with W because he could not practically 
continue his relationship with everyone in the house except W without causing potential NCO 
violations and without causing emotional harm to W as she compared his lack of contact with her 
to his continued relationship with the other daughters. R 40237, pp. 25-26. 
Mr. Vaughn's older two daughters wrote in support of his Criminal Rule 35 motion and 
request to modify the NCO. S (age l 0) wrote, "I need my daddy home. I've never had a mother. 
My name is [SJ. I love my daddy, he is my whole life .... " R 40237, p. 29. T (age 11) wrote, 
"My daddy was a good daddy ... It makes me cry when I don't have my daddy with me." R 
40237, p. 36. 
Many people wrote letters in Mr. Vaughn's support. People from his home town in 
Florida wrote that they had known him for years and noted many positive things about his 
character and actions. Excerpts follow: 
I have no reservations about writing this letter in order to attest to Charles Vaughn 
Jr.'s good character & heart." (Richard Bragg - known Mr. Vaughn for 20 years.) 
R 4023 7, p. 30. 
I have known Charles A. Vaughn for most of his life and have always found him 
to be dependable and a person of his word. (Marlene Markham) R 40237, p. 31. 
I have personally known Charles all of his life. I understand he is incarcerated 
and may be facing a prison sentence. Any and all leniency shown to him would 
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be greatly appreciated. (Dewey H. Hatcher Sr., Sheriff, Dixie County, Florida) R 
40237, p. 32. 
While we were married Mr. Vaughn was a great husband and father to me and his 
two children, plus he was a great father to my daughter [JP]. ... Mr. Vaughn was 
never abusive to me or to our children. He was a loving, caring and a very mature 
husband and father. [When we separated] he kept the children and did until he got 
incarcerated lin Idaho]. Them children love and miss their daddy bad. (Kathy 
Marie Vaughn (Mr. Vaughn's first wife)) R 40237, pp. 33-34. 
Charles Jr. loved his family and was a good father. His children need their father 
home with them. (Mr. and Mrs. Joe Carpenter - known Mr. Vaughn for 12 years) 
R 40237, p. 35. 
Chuck always did what he told me he was going to do and if he was unable to he 
always communicated with me. (Wesley Langdale - known Mr. Vaughn for 5 
years) R 40237, p. 37. 
I had many opportunities to observe Chuck Vaughn's life and character over the 
years. In my opinion he is hard working, honest, and always there for his family 
and friends. He is a great help and blessing to the Town of Steinhatchee .. (Pastor 
H.L. Holden, First Baptist Church, Steinhatchee, Florida - known Mr. Vaughn for 
several years through Mr. Vaughn's attendance and volunteer work for church) R 
40237, p. 38. 
I have always known Chuck to be a good father and a hard working man. His 
children need him home and his parents need his help in their family business 
building boats. (Trisha Downey - known Mr. Vaughn for 25 years) R 4023 7, p. 
39. 
Chuck has worked for me in the past and I would be interested in him working for 
me in the future. (Paul Ryan, Paul's Repair Shop, Steinhatchee, Florida) R 
40237, p. 40. 
Charles is like a son to me. He has spent half of his life at my home in Alamo, 
Ga. He is a good person, a good Dad, and a hard worker. (Bertha Fowler, Mr. 
Vaughn's aunt) R 40237, p. 41. 
We would like to have him home to help us with the running of the business and 
the care of the two children whose names are [T] and [SJ, that we are raising on 
his behalf. (Charles and Rachael Vaughn - Mr. Vaughn's parents) R 40237, p. 
42. 
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It is an honor for me to speak on behalf of this fine family and their son Charles 
Allen Vaughn. (William Corkin) R 40237, p. 43. 
His work and ability is good and outstanding. (John Phillip Savy - former 
employer) R 40237, p. 44. 
We have known Chuck all of his life .... he demonstrated the sound values 
instilled in him as he grew. As an adult he has shown himself to be a hard worker 
with a desire to have a family of his own to love and teach ... we hope you will 
consider release as soon as possible. (Ron and Sherry Herget - Mr. Vaughn's 
uncle and aunt) R 40237, p. 45. 
I have known Chuck Vaughn all his life ... we have known Chuck to be a kind, 
courteous person who always worked hard ... a loyal son and a devoted father. 
(George Karageorge) R 40237, p. 46. 
In addition, over 180 people of Steinhatchee, Florida signed a petition attesting to Mr. 
Vaughn's good character - and to the statement, "Chuck is not a threat to society and should be 
returned to his community." R 40237, pp. 49-60. 
Mr. Vaughn's Rule 35 motion was further supported by documentation of his 
participation in and completion of prison classes and activities. He attended 24 classes between 
March 9, 2010, and June 30, 2011, at the Interfaith Chapel. R 40237, p. 62. He completed an 
anger management course. R 40237, p. 83. He completed his GED. R 40237, p. 84. He 
completed the requirements for Workforce Readiness. R 40237, p. 86. He provided 
documentation that he could not participate in the Pathways Program because of the amount of 
fixed time he had left to serve. R 40237, p. 95. He attended 74 activities ranging from Alcoholic 
Anonymous to Special Services. R 40237, pp. 102-103. He was on the wait list for many 
programs from Electrical Wiring to Partners in Parenting. R 40237, pp. 104-105. He provided 
his library history record which showed a long list of self-help books borrowed. R 40237, pp. 
107-108. 
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The state filed an objection to the Rule motion. R 4023 7, pp. I 09-110. 
Without a hearing, the district court denied Mr. Vaughn's motion in a memorandum 
decision. In its opinion, the cout1 restated the facts underlying the plea agreement and explained 
how the original sentence was consistent with the Toohill factors. State v. Toohill, I 03 Idaho 
565,650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). The court stated that "in mitigation, the Court considered all 
the things he has argued in his Rule 35. The Court, however, found there were several 
aggravating factors in this case suggesting the need for this sentence." R 40237, p. 113. 
The Court concluded its decision: 
The Court found that the magnitude of this crime outweighed Vaughn's character 
and background. Therefore, the Court found that this sentence would promote 
rehabilitation; there is a need for some punishment that fits the crime before real 
rehabilitation will be effective. Finally, the Court finds that the crime itself 
simply deserves this punishment. It is a serious crime. The Court finds that this 
sentence fulfills the objectives of protecting society and achieves deterrence, 
rehabilitation and retribution and therefore denies Vaughn's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
R 40237, p. 115. 
The Court also denied Mr. Vaughn's motion to modify the no contact order. The Court 
wrote: "The Court also denies his Motion to modify his no contact order. lfhe cannot obey the 
one in place, the Court is not modifying it." R 40237, p. 115. 
A timely notice of appeal was filed. R 4023 7, pp. 117-1 I 9. 
3. Motion to Modifv No Contact Order 
The District Court denied Mr. Vaughn's Rule 35 motion on September 22, 2011. R 
40237, p. 115. 
On November 7, 2011, Mr. Vaughn filed a new prose motion to modify the NCO. In his 
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motion, Mr. Vaughn stated that it was in the best interest of W to allow phone and written 
contact between himself and her. R 39526, pp. 8-9. 
Mr. Vaughn suppo1ied his motion with a brief. In the brief, Mr. Vaughn set out that W 
was now in the care of the Idal10 Department of Health and Welfare and under an interstate 
compact that was placed with his parents in Florida. His parents also have custody of his other 
two daughters, T and S, and there is no limit on his contact with T and S. He speaks with T and 
S on the phone two to three times a week. His parents want to adopt W, but the issue of the 
NCO is impeding this as W will have to be excluded from his phone calls to T and Sor his 
contact with T and S will have to be abruptly ended. In either solution, the emotional well-being 
of the children will be adversely affected. Either W will believe that her father favors T and S 
because he has maintained a relationship with them, but not her, or T and Swill blame W for the 
severing of their relationship with Mr. Vaughn. R 39526, pp. 8-14. 
Mr. Vaughn supported his motion and brief with documentation of his completion of 
programs and activities at the prison. R 39526, pp. 15-25. 
However, the state opposed the motion stating that Mr. Vaughn had not cited any legally 
sufficient reason for modification. R 39526, p. 26-27. 
Although there was no order appointing counsel to represent Mr. Vaughn, a hearing was 
held and counsel from the public defender's office spoke for him. R 39526, p. 31. However, 
that attorney referenced the fact that he had just been handed the file and was not familiar with 
the case. Tr. 12/14/11, p. In. · p. 11, In. 9-14. That attorney did note that Mr. Vaughn 
wanted to help his parents obtain custody of W and that the NCO was having a negative impact 
on their ability to keep her. Tr. 12/14/11, p. 7, ln. 2-23. 
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The prosecuting attorney said that Mr. Vaughn's attempt to modify the NCO because he 
wanted to not violate the law was "laughable" because she had a stack of letters 3/4" thick 
showing that he had contacted his wife who was subject to the no contact order also. However, 
the prosecutor did not enter these letters into evidence. Tr. 12/14/11 p. 8, ln. 13 - p. 9, In. 24. 
The prosecutor also stated that she heard from the prior handling attorney that the mother of W 
was Native American so that might affect the placement of W. Tr. 12/14/11, p. 9, ln. 25 - p. 10, 
ln. 15. Again, the prosecutor offered no admissible evidence to support her report of this double 
hearsay of possible tribal membership. Finally, the prosecutor asserted that she had heard from a 
detective who said he had heard from Ms. Vaughn that Ms. Vaughn did not want the NCO 
modified. Tr. 12/14/11, p. 10, ln. 16-23. Again, no admissible evidence was provided to 
establish this double hearsay as to what Ms. Vaughn did or did not think about her daughter 
being denied contact with her father while living in a home with her two half-sisters who did 
have contact with her father. 
The attorney speaking on behalf of Mr. Vaughn then stated that Mr. Vaughn had told him 
that many of the allegations of violation of the no contact order had been dismissed. Tr. 
12/14/11, p. 11, In. 16 - p. 12, ln. 7. 
In response, the prosecutor stated that the department of corrections had dismissed 
potential violations based on the no contact order, but the prosecutor did not know about any of 
this until recently and that her office might decide to have a fingerprint analysis done to see if 
Mr. Vaughn really wrote these letters that she had in her stack of papers that was never entered 
into evidence in this case. Tr. 12/14/11, p. 12, ln. 8-23. 
In response, the court stated that it remembered the case well and had the police reports. 
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Tr. 12/14/11, p. 10, In. 22-23. The court then misstated the facts ofthe underlying case -
including stating that Mr. Vaughn had threatened to kill W. Tr. 12/14/11, p. 10, In. 22-25. In 
fact, Mr. Vaughn never threatened to kill W. PSI pp. 2-3. The court further stated that Mr. 
Vaughn had a long history of violence against intimate partners. Tr. 12/14/11, p. 11, In. 6-8. 
However, in fact, Mr. Vaughn's prior record included no convictions for violence against 
intimate partners. \Vhile he had arrests in 2002 and 2007 for misdemeanor "battery-touch or 
strike domestic violence" in Florida, the cases did not result in convictions. PSI pp. 4-5. Further, 
his ex-wife Kathy wrote a letter to the court at the time of sentencing stating that he had not been 
violent in their relationship. PSI, pp. 23-24. It was true, however, that his stepchildren had told 
police that the family moved to Idaho because of violence against Ms. Vaughn. PSI p. 148. 
Later in the proceedings, the court stated that, if the court remembered correctly, Mr. Vaughn had 
wanted the court to order that he get back with his wife. Tr. 12/14/ 11, p. 16, In. 9-11. While Mr. 
Vaughn did ask the court to impose a sentence of probation so that he could remain with his 
wife, PSI p. 22, and did ask that the NCO be modified so that he could contact Ms. Vaughn, PSI 
p. 4, the record does not show that Mr. Vaughn ever asked the court to order he and his wife 
reconcile. Tr. 10/28/09; Tr. 12/30/09; PSI. 
After its recitation of the case, the court stated that Mr. Vaughn had continued to violate 
the NCO while in prison and "Absolutely, no I'm not going to change this no-contact order. 
Period. I'm not going to do it." Tr. 12/14/11, p. 17, ln. 1 14. The court did not reference any of 
the information presented in Mr. Vaughn's motion and brief in support regarding what would be 
in the best interests of W nor did it reference Mr. Vaughn's constitutional right to parent his 
children. Tr. 12/14/11. 
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The court then offered comments about the judge's prior experience in Native American 
law and opined that perhaps the tribe had priority in placement of W. Tr. 12/14/11, p. 17, ln. 15-
21. 
A written order was entered that stated without analysis: "It is hereby ordered that 
Defendant's Motion to Modify No Contact Order is hereby Denied." R 39526, p. 32. 
Mr. Vaughn filed a timely prose notice of appeal. R 39526, pp. 33-35. 
Two and a half months later, the Court entered an Amended No Contact Order. R 39526, 
p. 41. While the original order contained an expiration date of December 30, 2029, the amended 
order expires December 30, 2029, or upon dismissal of the case, whichever occurs first. R 
38862, p. 72; R 39526, p. 41. 4 The amended order was entered nunc pro tune to December 30, 
2009. R 39526, p. 41. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 35 motion for reduction 
of sentence? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to modify the NCO? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Denying the Rule 35 Motion 
The decision to grant or deny a Rule 35 motion lies within the discretion of the district 
court. In this case, the court abused its discretion. 
The district court based its sentence on its conclusion that the magnitude of the crime 
"outweighed" Mr. Vaughn's character and that the crime by itself "simply deserves this 
4 Of course, since Mr. Vaughn has been convicted, his case will not be dismissed. 
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punishment." R 40237, p. 115. However, sentences are to be imposed "having regard to the 
nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest" 
State v. Wo(fe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Coassolo, 136Idaho 138, 140-41,30P.3d293,295-96(2001). Thcdistrictcourt's 
determination that the nature of the offense alone eclipsed consideration of Mr. Vaughn's 
character was an abuse of discretion. 
A Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 14 3 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 
23, 24 (2006). In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is 
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P .3d 838, 840 (2007). In 
conducting an appellate review of the grant or denial of Rule 35 relief, the appellate court 
considers the entire record and applies the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness 
of the original sentence. State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740 P.2d 63, 64 (CL App. 1987). 
A district court necessarily abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view 
of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Young v. Williams, 1 Idaho 
649, 652, 837 P.2d 324, (Ct. App. 1992). The sequence of inquiry on appeal is: (1) whether 
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 
993, 1000 (1991). 
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In this case, the district court abused its discretion insofar as it determined that the nature 
of the offense standing alone required the fixed term it imposed- regardless of any information 
Mr. Vaughn presented about his character. 5 
Idaho has long held that "the law recognizes that the previous character, good or bad, of 
one convicted should be considered in fixing the punishment." State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 
411,273 P.2d 97, 114 (1954). See also, State v. Powell, 71 Idaho 131,227 P.2d 582 (1951), 
overruled in part by State v. White, 93 Idaho 153,456 P.2d 797 (1969). As set out in Wolfe, 
supra., other relevant factors include: (1) the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense of 
conviction; (2) whether the defendant is a first offender; (3) the previous actions and character of 
the defendant; ( 4) whether the defendant might reasonably be expected to be rehabilitated; and 
( 5) the interests of society in being protected from possible future criminal conduct of the 
defendant. 99 Idaho at 395, 582 P.2d at 741, ftnt. 1. 
Most recently, the Court of Appeals in State v. Justice, 152 Idaho 48, 266 P.3d 1153 (Ct. 
App. 2011 ), modified a district court sentence. In so doing, the Court noted that the task of 
appellate sentence review is neither easy nor well defined and that deference is due the trial court. 
However, the Court of Appeals began its analysis by considering Justice's age. In so doing, the 
5 Note that this case is clearly not the type of case addressed in State v. Windom, 150 
Idaho 873,876,253 P.3d 310, 313 (2010), wherein an offense may be found to be so egregious 
that a fixed life term can be imposed without regard to the characteristics and background of the 
offender. That sort of offense appears to be limited to matricide and possibly infanticide. 
Windom; State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 191 P.3d 271 (2008). And, that sort of analysis may 
ultimately be held to be violative of the Eight Amendment. See Miller v. Alabama,~ U.S. 
~' 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2462 (2012), noting that the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and 
unusual punishment '" flows from the basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should 
be graduated and proportioned' as to both the offender and the offense." quoting Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005) quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349,367, 30 S.Ct. 544 (1910) (emphasis added). 
19 
Court specifically noted that an independent review of the record ''having regard for the nature of 
the offense, the character of the offender. and the protection of the pubic interest" was required. 
152 Idaho at 53, 266 P.3d at 1158 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the district court looked at the nature of the offense and then concluded that 
despite all the material provided in support of the Rule 3 5 motion, the offense itself "outweighed 
Vaughn's character and background." While the court stated that "in mitigation, the Court 
considered all the things he has argued in his Rule 35," the use of tense and the placement of the 
statement in the court's opinion all suggest that the court was saying that it considered this 
information at the original sentencing, which was impossible because this information had not 
been presented at sentencing.6 It was only presented at the Rule 35. 
This was an abuse of discretion. 
The district court is to consider not only the nature of the offense - it is to also consider 
the defendant's character and background. While a district court might find that considering both 
the nature of the offense and the background and character of a defendant is required, the district 
court cam10t conclude, except in the most egregious of cases, that the nature of the offense 
trumps all information about the character and background of the defendant and thus, no matter 
who the defendant is and what his circumstances are, impose the same prison term. In failing to 
consider Mr. Vaughn's background and character and the new information he presented not only 
in support of his character and background but also information about how he had participated in 
6 The court wrote: "In arriving at this sentence, the Court considered Vaughn's character 
and any mitigating or aggravating factors. In mitigation, the court considered all the things he 
has argued in his Rule 35. The Court, however, found there were several aggravating factors in 
this case - suggesting the need for this sentence." R 40237 p. 113. 
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what programs he could in prison and how his fixed term limited his ability to access other 
programs, the district court abused its discretion. 
Further, if the court's statement that it had considered all the Rule 3 5 information at the 
original sentencing is given credence, even then there was an abuse of discretion - because the 
information was not available at the original sentencing hearing. The court was simply mistaken 
that it considered this information in mitigation when fashioning the original sentence. 
In either event, there was an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Mr. Vaughn asks that this 
Court reverse the order denying Rule 35 relief. 
Mr. Vaughn further asks that this Court apply the remedy it did in Justice. Ile asks that 
this Court review the totality of the record including the material supplied in support of his Rule 
35 motion and grant the Rule 35 motion by reducing his fixed term to no more than three years as 
requested in his Rule 35 motion. Such a reduction would make him now eligible for parole. R 
40237, p. 18.7 
B. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Denying the Motion to Modify 
the No Contact Order 
The district court entered an order prohibiting all contact between Mr. Vaughn and his 
wife, step-children, and biological daughter. The court later denied Mr. Vaughn's motion to 
modify the order as to his biological daughter W. In denying the motion to modify, the district 
court abused its discretion because the court failed to act consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it and because the court failed to reach its decision by an 
exercise of reason. In particular, the court misunderstood the record before it, failed to recognize 
7 Mr. Vaughn's current parole eligibility date is December 24, 2014. 
www.accessidaho.org/public/corr/offender/search.html 
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the fundamental right of a parent to parent his/her children, and failed to recognize as argued by 
Mr. Vaughn in his motion to modify, that modification of the no contact order would be in the 
best interest of W. 
The imposition and modification of a no contact order is discretionary with the district 
court. LC.§ 18-920(1); ICR 46.2. State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769,771,229 P.3d 374,376 
(2010). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, a multi-level inquiry is 
made to determine: 1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with 
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and 3) whether the lower court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., supra. 
In this case, the district court abused its discretion in multiple ways. First, the court 
misunderstood the record before it. Contrary to the court's stated understanding, there was 
nothing in the record to establish that Mr. Vaughn had ever threatened to kill W. Further, the 
court did not properly understand Mr. Vaughn's prior record which did not include multiple 
convictions for prior crimes against intimate partners. And, the court expressed an incorrect 
recollection that Mr. Vaughn had previously asked the court to order him and his wife to 
reconcile. 
Second, the court did not act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it. Specifically, the court did not act 
consistently with the constitutional right to parent one's own children. 
Idaho has long recognized the fundamental right to parent one's own children. See State 
v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534,536, 164 P.3d 814,816 (2007); Leavitt v. Leavitt, 142 Idaho 664,670, 
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132 P.3d 421, 427 (2006). 
'The substantial due process right to family integrity or to familial association is 
well established. A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in companionship 
with his or her child. Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It 'is perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme Court].' Troxell v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality). 
'This interest occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of 
family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. "Far more 
precious than property rights," those "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men," and to be more significant and priceless than "liberties which derive 
merely from shifting economic arrangements."' Lassiter v. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 
452 U.S. 18, 38, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (quoting multiple Supreme Court cases) (individual citations omitted); 
see also, id. at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that '[t]his 
Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation 
that a parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody and 
management of his or her children is an important interest' and that infringement 
on this right 'work[s] a unique kind of deprivation') (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(describing parents' right to familial association as an 'essential liberty interest'). 
United States v. Wo(fChild, 699 F.3d 1082, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2012). 
Idaho's Supreme Court has not yet addressed the interplay of the fundamental 
constitutional due process right to parent one's children and the issuance ofNCOs in criminal 
cases. See Cobler, supra, wherein the Supreme Court held that the district court abused its 
discretion in failing to modify an NCO in a criminal case without reaching the constitutional 
questions. However, Washington state and the federal courts have both addressed the question 
and concluded that a term in a NCO limiting the fundamental right to contact with and parenting 
of one's own children impacts the constitutional right and must be limited to that reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state. State v. Letourneau, l 00 Wash.App. 
424, 997 P.2d 436,411 (2000); United States v. Wo(f Child, 699 F.3d at 1092. In determining 
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whether the limitation on the parent/child relationship is reasonably necessary, fVolfChild holds 
that the right to parent must be balanced against the interests of the state, and when conflict.ing, 
against the interests of the children. However, interference with the parental right requires "a 
powerful countervailing interest" and any limitation must be no greater deprivation of the liberty 
interest that is reasonably necessary. Id Both Latourneau and Wo!f Child consider the state's 
essential need to be the need to protect the defendant's children from harm by the defendant, not 
the need to punish the defendant. Latourneau, 997 P.2d at 446; Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1094. 
In this case, the district court did not even acknowledge that the motion to modify the 
NCO implicated Mr. Vaughn's fundamental constitutional right to parent W. Nor did the court 
justify its decision not to allow Mr. Vaughn telephone and written contact with Was necessary to 
meet the essential need of the state to protect W. Nor did the court consider W interests - and 
whether modifying the NCO would be in her best interests as otherwise it negatively impacts her 
placement with her grandparents who also have custody of Mr. Vaughn's other two biological 
daughters with whom he was allowed free contact. 8 
The district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to modify the NCO. It 
abused its discretion in misunderstanding the record from the underlying case; it abused its 
discretion in not acting within the constitutional limitations on its authority to interfere with Mr. 
8 The rights and relationships implicated in this case go far beyond just Mr. Vaughn's 
rights as a father. They include W's rights and relationships as a daughter, sister, and 
granddaughter; her sisters' rights and relationships with W, their father, and their grandparents; 
and the girls' grandparents rights and relationships with both their son and their grandchildren. 
See United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010), recognizing that a ban on 
association with a "life partner" implicates a particularly significant liberty interest. Further see, 
Troxell v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 88, 120 S.Ct. at 1072 (Stevens, J. dissenting), noting "the 
child's own complementary interest in preserving relationships that serve her welfare and 
protection." 
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Vaughn's parental rights; and it abused its discretion in not considering the information 
presented by Mr. Vaughn that the NCO was not in the best interests of W. Therefore, Mr. 
Vaughn asks that this Court reverse the order denying modification of the NCO and grant 
modification to allow him telephone and written contact with W. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Vaughn asks this Court to reverse the order denying 
his Rule 35 motion and grant him relief by reducing the fixed portion of his sentence to two 
years. He further requests that this Court reverse the order denying modification of the NCO and 
modify the order to allow him telephone and written contact with W. 
Respectfully submitted this~y of January, 2013. 
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